
Class. 
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SPEECH 
MRr'BELL, OF TENNESSEE, 

A H 

OV THE "'""!^- •>♦■> 

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ^ -^^ 



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07 V' 



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Delivered in the House of Representatives, December 26, 1838. 



The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state ol the Union, for 
llie purpose of considering and referring the President's Message — 

Mr. BELL said that ihe njessage of the President of the United States must 
always be an important document — one which would be looked to with in- 
terest, not (»nly at home, but abroad — a paper which would be examined and 
carefully weighed, not only with reference to the casual and extraordinary 
topics which might engage (he public mind for the moment, but in reference 
to subjects less H(;eting and t(!niporary — to the doctrines, the principles, and 
tlie practices, whicli appeared to be countenanced and propatjfnted — doctrines 
and practices which were calculated to endure ; which were fundamental ; 
which related to the organic consiruotion of our system : and he lud risen to 
make some observations more in reference to these oeneral and prominent 
topics touched upon in the Message, than to the exciting and absor!)ing sub- 
treasury scheme, or tlie mode of collecting, safe keeping, and disbursing, the 
public revenue ; and, taking the views he did, he should proceed at once to 
notice some passages in the Mi^ssage, which, in his opinion, called Uji- public 
scrutiny and animadversion. 

In treating of our system of government, and more iiarliculariy of the 
federal constitution, the President informs us that — 

" It has proved amply sulTitient for the various emergencies incident to our condition aa 
a nation. A formidable foreign war ; agitating collisions between domestic, and, in some 
respects, rival sovereignties ; temptations to interfere in the intestinf comuiotions of neigh- 
boring countries ; the dangerous influences that arise in periods of excessive j»rosperity ; and 
the antl-rcpublicun tendencies of a.'jiuciatcd wealth ; these, with otl)er trials not less formi- 
dahle, have all been encountered, and thus far successfully resisted." 

Among the most prominent dangers to which our form of government is 
exposed, the President here enumerales " the anti-rtpublican tendencies of 
associated wealth.''^ 1 suppose (sold Mr. B.) il will be said that he refers to 
the associati()n of capital accumulated in the State banks; but, in the opinion 
of the communily generally, this language will warrant a more extensive ap- 
plication — an application far more operative, and demanding more serious re- 
flection. But, before we inquire into the true import and probable drift of 
this address to the American people on the subject of the "anti-republican 
tendencies of associated wealth," one ren)ark occurs to me as proper to be 
inade on what appears to be an omission in this part of the Message. I ob- 
serve that no notice is taken of the danger to be apprehended from the con- 
centration of power in the hands of one man, or of a few. Whatever may 
be said of the selfish, exclusive, grasping, monopolizing, and anti-republican 
tendencies of mere wealth, I will not deny ; yet I will say that all these bad 
qualities and tendencies may, with as much truth, and far more reason, be 



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affirmed of political j90wcr; and it must strike the mind of every watchful ob- 
server, that, in the enumeration of the many dangers to which our country and 
its peculiar institutions are exposed — an enumeration made in order to put the 
people on their guard — the President has omitted to mention the most for- 
midable of all; one which is known to have existed in the experience and 
progress of every free Government, and in the progress of every civilized 
society, from the beginning of time. I mean concentrated power — associated 
official power. I mean (to speak practically) the concentration of power in 
the executive branch of the Government of the United States, It is worthy 
of serious notice that in a paper emanating, as this does, from the President 
himself, and which professes to set forth to a free people the most prominent 
dangers which threaten their liberties, and to awaken their vigilance against 
those evil tendencies which lurk in the system, the one which has always pro- 
ved the most fatal — the tendency of power to accumulate in the hands of one 
man, and the grasping and monopolizing tendenc}' of that power — is altogether 
omitted. Wliy is this"? Why not admonish the people, wlien speaking of 
the tendencies of wealth in banks or elsewhere, ihat there was another most 
formidable danger in this and in every other free Government, which united 
all the evils of mere wealth with the more fearful passion of ambition? I 
affirm, then, sir, that this enumeration of the perils to which our free institu- 
tions are exposed is not perfect. 

If, said JMr. B., this warning given to the people in relation to the " anti- 
republican tendency of associated wealth" is only intended to be a continua- 
tion of the attacks heretofore made with so much acrimony upon the banking 
institutions of the country, I will not undertake to answer it in my own lan- 
guage, or by any arguments of my own, for I have never felt disposed to be- 
come the champion of those institutions ; but in the language and by the argu- 
ments of a man of far more weight and influence, both from the station which 
he fills, and the large share of respect and influence he has always enjoyed 
with the party in power — a man whose late political career was directly con- 
nected with the most extraordinary incidents of the late administration — a man 
who owes his present elevation to the hearty approval with which his party 
sustained him in the most questionable act of that administration ; a man 
whose opinions upon the question now under review were then received as 
orthodox and incoinrovertible. I allude to the Chief Justice of the United 
States, (Mr. Taney.) 

[Mr. B. read from a letter of Mr. Taney, while Secretary of the Treasury, to the Com- 
mittee of Ways and Means, of the 13th of April, 1834, a few paragraphs strongly com- 
mendatory of the State banks, and asserting in very broad terms the indispensable agency 
in a country like ours of banks and a paper circulation founded on credit.] 

But, Mr. Chairman, if I correctly understand the import of the passage now 
under consideration, it manifests a laxity of principle, a recklessness of con- 
sequences ; such a spirit of desperation in the choice of means to sustain pow- 
er as ought to receive the severest reprehension from every well-wisher to our 
free institutions. This covert denunciation of wealth and of the rich is, 
without doubt, intended to be understood by those whom it pleases as a proof 
that the author of it is a friend and champion of the poor, as distinguished from 
the rich. Viewing it in this light, it is a sort of argument — an electioneering' 
cant, which, however shameful and indefensible, may be allowed in the pub- 
lic speeches of ordinary candidates for a seat in the Legislature, or for some 
office or station in a State, or even for a seat in this Hall of the Kepresenta- 
tives of the nation ; but in a Chief Magistrate it is wholly unworthy and 
detestable. 



The next passage I shall sotice in this extraordinary paper is in these 
words : 

** Each successive change made in our local institutions has contributed to extend the 
right of suffrage, has increased the direct influence offhemassofihecontmuniti/, given 
greater freedom to individual exertion, and restricted more and more the poivers oj 
Government." 

In the remarks I propose to make on the sentiment here expressed, I would 
not be understood as finding fault with the extension of the right of suffrage- 
In the State of Tennessee, and the Southwest generally, the right of suffrage 
has lung existed in the fullest extent; nor am I disposed to say aught against 
the polic} of other States in this respect ; but I have a word or two to say 
in reference to the conclusion which the President has drawn from this and 
other changes in our local institutions. He undertakes to announce to the 
world that the effect of these changes has been to " increase the direct in- 
fluence of the mass of the community, and to restrict more and more the pow- 
ers of Government." Now, sir, however true this may be, when affirmed of 
the influence of the mass of the community, in the several Stales alluded to, 
and upon their measures and policy, and the restrictions which may have fol- 
lowed upon the powers of the State Governments, if it is intended by infer- 
ence to atfirm that the direct influence of the mass of the comnmnity upon the 
measures and policy of the national Government has been increased, or that 
the powers of the General Government have been restricted by any changes 
which have been made in any quarter, I deny that such is the fact. I make 
the issue direct. I aftirm that whatever improvements may have followed 
from the changes of any kind in the constitutions of the Stales — whatever re- 
strictions ma\" have followed upon ll.e powers of the State Governments, no 
such beneficial consequences have been felt in the operations of the Federal 
Government ; though we might have supposed that the benefits of the exten- 
sion of the right of suffrage, or other change in the local institutions, would 
have been felt, in some small degree at least, in the action of the General 
Government. But, sir, at no anterior period in the history of this country 
has the influence, direct and indirect, of the mass of th.c community been so 
little felt in the conduct of our national affairs, nor have the powers of the 
Federal Government ever before been strained to so high a point, if we may 
judge of these powers by the practice of the late and present administrations. 
Never before were the mass of the community so powerless. Of late, they 
have substantially nothing to do, having neither part nor lot in the aftairs of 
the Government or of the country, but to follow blindly, and give their sanc- 
tion, when called upon for that purpose, to whatever schemes and measures of 
public policy the heads of the party, some three or four men at most, are 
pleased to dictate to ihera. Such is and has been the power of party disci- 
pline, such the despotic principle of party association for years, that the mass 
of the community have rather stood in the relation of subjects to be governed 
than the controlling elements of power. How this has been brought about — 
by what artful means — by what powers of intimidation on the one hand, and 
of seduction on the other, the mass of the people have had so little actual in- 
^uence in the affairs of Government of lale — I have often described on this 
floor. I have repeatedly referred to this subject as the origin of all the evils 
which now atflict the country. I content myself, for the present, by repeat- 
ing that the mass of the people have for years been degraded to the rank of 
mere machines in the hands of a few men who have had the talent and address 
to use them for their own purposes. Never before were a free people under 
such positive, such despotic control, as the people of the United States have 



Seen, by the artful management of a few men, acting in conjunction with the 
powerful influences of overgrown patronage. I again affirm that at no period 
since the organization of the Government in 1789, have its powers been so 
extensive in practice. Of ifiie, tliey tiave undoubtedly been carried far be- 
jon.l the example of any preceding administration. Then, sir, 1 conclude 
that the President holds out an unfounded assurance to the coimlry. We 
cannot safely congratulate ourselves that the people have had the spl>cre of 
iheir iniliietict' increased, or that the powers of the Governnieni have been 
restricted. 

After enumeraling many of the happy results of our republican institu- 
tions, the President expresses the following sentiment : 

"This review of the results of our institutions for half a century, without exciting a 
spirit of vain exultation, should serve to impress upon us the great principles from which 
^h.ey sprung — constmt and dlrtd supervision by the people over every public measure," S[C. 

(Mow, sir, (said Mr. B.,) 1 should be pleased to be informed what is meant 
oy the " constant and tlirect supervision of the people,'''' which is here enu- 
merated as one of the greiit principles to which we are indebted fur the glo- 
fious results of our system.. Will some gentleman who is better acquainted 
with liie sentiments of tiie President upon this subject enlighten me? Will 
he tell me what is the true import of the language, " the constant and direct 
sujervis'ion bythc people V is it intended by this passagein the Message, and 
the other doctrines which are more or less openly inculcated, to give the high 
official sanction of the Chief Magistrate ofthe Union to the new impulse which 
has recently been given, or sought to be given, to what are called the demo- 
cratic tendencies of our system? You mustbeaware,Mr. Chairman, that unusu- 
al pairs have been taken of late to show that our system needs a radical re- 
vision. The j)eople are tuld that our ancestors, who framed the constitu- 
tion in 1789, were half a century in the rear of the improvements of the 
present age; that they had not the benefit of the new lights which experi- 
snce has shed upon tiie subject of government since that time, and which 
are now in full blaze around us. The science of government, we are told, 
3}as made great strides since our constitution was formed ; and, indeed, that 
instrument is beginning to be looked upon by many rather as a device of 
bad men, to advance the interests of the \'e\v at the expense of the many, and 
forming an actual obstruction to that full tide of happiness and prosperity 
which awaits us wlien tlie inventions of modern democracy shall be substi- 
tuted for it. At all events, it is proclaimed to be the duty of every man 
who would im[)rove the condition of the human family to strengthen the 
democratic tendencies of the constitution, and to disrobe or rather strip it of 
rhose limitations and restrictions upon the popular will, with which our un- 
improved ancestors had thought it necessary to encumber it. Some progress 
has already been made in implanting this sentiment among the people in some 
ofthe States. New party names have been invented for this purpose. New 
definitions have been given of free Governments. An old-fashioned repub- 
jican is denounced as little better than an aristocrat. We hear of late, from 
she leaders of one ofthe great parties which divide the country, of little else 
ihan the democracy of the country — the great democratic family — the de- 
aiocracy of numbers! In truth, sir, it cannot be disguised that there are a 
class of politicians in the country at this moment, whose aspirations it does 
aot suit that any restriction, any limitation whatever, shall exist i« the prac- 
tice of the Government upon the will or absolutism ofthe majority ; and, in 
the estimation of all their followers, our constitution is defective. It im- . 
poses quite too many trammels, in their judgments, upon the beneficent de- 



signs of the reformers. Does the President mean to be understood as conn- 
tenancing the doctrines of these reformers, by pointing to the " constant and 
direct supervision by the people," as an important principle in a free Gov- 
ernnient 1 Sir, I would be the last man in this House to question ihe true 
constitutional principle of popular supervision over the measures of the Gov- 
ernment. It is to the operation of that princi[>le that we are to look fot 
safety in times which, perhaps, may be worse than the present ; and I trust 
we shall not look to it in vain. But, sir, according to cur system, the people 
do not, and cannot, exercise any direct supervision over any public measure. 
Their power, their influence, their supervision, can be constitutionally exer- 
cised only by petiti.)n and remonstrance, and by the utterance of their voice 
at the ballot-box. And it is that feature in our system that at once distin- 
guishes it in form from a democracy, and secures it from the fatal catastrophe 
which has always attended democracies, or Governments in which the peo- 
ple exercised a direct supervision over public measures. 

But it would be gratifying to know what change in our constitution is med- 
itated, by which the people may be admitted to a "direct supervision" of 
public measures; or is it intended that the people shall interpose their au- 
thority, whenever, in their judgment, the constitutional functionaries shall 
err, or fail in the discharge of their duty, without any pmendment of the con- 
stitution 1 We have very lately liad a specimen of this impioved system af 
government announced through the mtdiuni of an Executive communication. 
We have heard the doctrine proclaimed on this floor ; we have seen it an- 
nounced in several of the most influential journals in the counry, and, among 
the rest, the official organ of this administration, (the Globe,) that the di- 
rect interference of the people, or, in other words, the democracy of the 
country, in the settlement of constitutional and legal questions, is not only 
allowable, but justifiable! We have heard it proclaimed from all these high 
and authoritative sources, that an excited and agitated assembly of the peo- 
ple may properly rush into a legislative hall, fill all the aisles and other va- 
cant places, and, by their menaces and clamors for the blood of obnoxiouf 
individuals, drive the Speaker from his chair, and the members from their 
seats ! In such a proceeding, it is said, tliore is " no positive violence ;" 
and when successful, it is proclaimed a triumph of the democracy — a triumph 
of the people? Is this the sort of " direct supervision" of the people whici? 
has been the source of so many happy and glorious results past ; or is it only 
from such a supervision of the people that, the future peace and happiness 
and prosperity of the country are to spring] Is it already come to this, un- 
der the reforming hand of the party in power, that if on an occasion similar 
to that which occurred in this House only a year ago — I allude to the vote 
of the House in excluding the members from Mississippi, (Messrs. Pbentisc 
and WoKD,) although clearly chosen by the people of Mississippi, upon (he 
ground of a mere technicality, and thereby depriving an entire State of any 
representation whatever in this House for several months — I ask again, has 
it come to this: that if in that case this Hall had been suddenly filled with a 
heated and turbulent multitude, menacing violence and blood, and calling- 
upon the House to reverse its decision, the proceedings would be sustained 
and justified as a wholesome and proper supervision of the people? Is this 
one of the improvements in government which our ancestors were ignorant 
of when they framed the constitution ? Suppose, sir, that the gentlemen 
from Mississippi had called their partisans and personal supporters to this 
Capitol, (and no two gentlemen on tliis floor could have rallied a band oi' 
more devoted friends around them) — suppose them arrived in the city, and. 



in their fury, preoccupying this Hall, calling upon the House to revise its 
sentence, and denouncing vengeance against all who should oppose their 
wishes, would the friends of the administration upon this floor, would the 
leaders of the party any where, have declared such an irruption into this 
House a wholesome interposition of the people? And when we had tamely 
submitted, reversed our decision, and restored the rejected members to their 
seats, would they have proclaimed it a triumph of the people ? A triumph, 
indeed, it might he, but it would have been a triumph over the constitution ; 
and however palpably erroneous, however shocking to reason and common 
sense, the decision of the House was, in the case alluded to, it may be a sub- 
ject of just exultation to the opposition, and it ought to be a subject of se- 
rious reflection with every honest man in the whole country, that not one of 
them would, for one moment, have tolerated the suggestion, that the House 
ought to be awed into submission upon that question by the direct interposi- 
tion of the people. 

In another passage of the message, we are assured by the President that 
"To this practical operation of our institutions, [which he had described,] so evident 
smd successful, ice owe that increased attachment to them, which is among the most cheer- 
ing exhibitions of popular sentiment." 

I deny, (said Mr. B.,) most confidently and emphatically, that wc are au- 
thorized to boast of this " increased attachment" to our institutions. On the 
contrary, I affirm that, for years, the attachment of the people to our insti- 
tutions, and iheir confidence in their efficacy and durability, have been weak- 
ening and diminishing, just in proportion as the principles and practices of 
the party in power have been more and more developed and brought to light. 
I affirm that, instead of increased attachment, there is manifestly increased 
distrust; and thousands of honest and intelligent citizens throughout the land 
look with apprehension and dread to the future — that future which may come 
sooner upon us than you or I now dream of. Again, sir, I affirm that, in the 
entire period since the organization of the Government, there has never been 
so general a relaxation of all the ties and obligations, legal and political, which 
bind society together, as prevails at the present moment. At no former pe- 
riod has so general a spirit of opposition to legal restraints or requirements 
manifested itsftlf tliroughout the country, when they stand in the way of wil- 
ful passions or purposes of any kind. Slight regard for the constitution and 
laws, commencing with the Government itself and its administrators, has grad- 
ually difll'used itself over society. There was a period in British history which 
presented a striking parallel of the times in this country. Had I been pre- 
pared for this debate, I might have presented such a picture, drawn from that 
period, as would have been recognised at once as the prototype of the state 
erf things in this country at the present moment. It was just a century ago 
that violence and licentiousness took the place of law and sound public mor- 
als in Great Britain, and from causes very like those which exist in this coun- 
try at this good time. Party spirit was excited to the highest state of vio- 
lence consistent with the existence of Government ; and the people, general- 
ly, in the progress of the conflict, were alternately excited by a distrust of 
the intentions of the ministry and a contempt for the authority of the Govern- 
ment. One man, of singular coolness and forbearance in temper, b\' prac- 
tising upon the principle that the mass of every society is moved b}' the mere 
love of gain — that there is no honesty in politics — that every man has his 
price, contrived to sustain himself in power nearly twenty years, in the face 
of a powerful opposition in both Houses of Parliament, and in the midst of 
" the loudest clamor and discontent among the people. It was generally be- 



Heved that he had grossly abused the great trust which had been confided to 
him by his sovereign ; tliat he had distributed and prostituted the immense 
jjatronage of the Crown to the purpose of enriching liiniself and his personal 
favorites. He interfered directly in the election of members of Parliament, 
both by his personal influence and by the application of large sums of the 
public moneys ; and he filled that body with placemen and dependants. He 
practised so openly upon the spoils system, that he once declared in his place, 
in the House of Commons, that he would h^ a pitiful fellow of a Minister who 
would not remove any man from office who opposed his measures. In such 
a state of things, general distrust and discontent banished all respect and con- 
fidence ; confusion and disorganization usurped the place of law and order; 
and the same causes must produce the same results here. 

The next passage of the Message which I am tempted to notice is in these 
words : 

" Nearly eight millions of dollars of Treasury notes are to be paid during the corning 
year, in addition to the ordinary appropriations for the support of Government. For 
both these purposes the resources of the Treasury will undouhtedhj be sufficient, if thb 

CHAUG£S UPON IT ARi: XOT IXtREASEI) BEYOXB THE ANNUAL ESTIMATES." 

Much (said Mr. B.) is said in the succeeding paragraph of the Message of 
the frauds committed by the public officers upon the public revenue ; and 
many severe remedies are suggested to correct this great public evil. Some 
remedy is also imperatively demanded by the public interest for the repeated 
and systematic frauds and impositions practised upon the public credulity by 
the highest functionaries of the Government, in their communications to this 
House and to the public, professing to contain tiieir political creed, and to 
present a candid view of the condition of the finances and other branches of 
the public service. The people are reluctant to conclude that the very high- 
est and most honored public officers, and those in whom the nation has ex- 
pressed its confidence, would deceive them ; and thus the most shameful of- 
ficial hypocrisy and delinquency are rewarded with renewed confidence, in- 
stead of resentment and indignation. I was struck with the remark of a very 
acute and able member of this House the other day, upon tiie subject of the 
relative prospects of the administration and opposition. He said the oppo- 
sition would probably not succeed, whatever apparent advantages they may 
have in the contest. If t!ie opposition, said he, claim any merit as the ad- 
vocates of economy in the public expendittires, or as the champions of the 
policy of limiting executive power and patronage, they will find that the 
claim will avail them nothing; for, upon none of these questions, nor upon 
any other popular doctrine of a similar nature, will the administration make 
an issue with them. On the contrary, in the messages, and the communica- 
tions from the Treasury Department, the members of the administration will 
be found to be as much the friends of economy, of reform, and as much op- 
posed to the increase of executive power and patronage, as any member of 
the opposition. 

Sir, this is very near the truth, at least. Those under whose auspices the 
annual expenditures of the Government have been increased, within a term 
of less than ten years, from thirteen to thirty millions of dollars, and execu- 
tive patronage in a correspondent ratio, can point to public documents ema- 
nating from their own hands, in which they have written with as much ap- 
parent earnestness, and said as many fine things in favor of economy and 
every other republican principle and practice, as any of their opponents. 
This, sir, I contend, is a species of fraud which calls for a remedy. Those 
who have practised it should be stripped of the mask under which they have 
heretofore deceived the people. 



In the present Messajre wo have an earnest exliortation to Congress to con— 
tine the appropiiations fur the year 1839 within the estimates of the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury. In the report of the Secretary himself there is a sim- 
ilar appeal made in behalf of economy and retrenchment! The Secretary 
of liie Treasury, in liis last annual report, estimates the appropriations which 
will be required fur the next year (1839) at $21,665,089. What amount 
will actually be required for the public service, we shall see at the close of 
the session. But whatever degree of candor may characterize the estimates 
of the Treasury for the year 1839, cannot excuse or atone for the gross de- 
ception practised by that Department in the annual estimates for the present 
year, (1838,) submitted December 5, 1837 ; and the still more glaring and 
shameful attempt to mislead the public, by the statement drawn up under 
the direction of Mr. Woodbury, and presented to the Senate on the 29lh of 
June last, (1838.) That statement purports to show the amount of the cn- 
nual estimates, and t!ie annual expenditures, exclusive of the public debt, 
with tlir. ctcr.ss of cipprnpriation above the estimates, in each year, from 1823 
to 1837, inclusive. The statement was drawn up, no doubt, to answer or 
parry the arguments of the opposition to the administration, drawn from the 
fact that, in 1836, the annual expenditures of the Government had risen to 
thirty millions and upwards, and, in 1837, to upwards of thirty-nine millions. 
Before this statement made its appearance, the partisans and apologists of 
the administration affirmed that the expenditures of the Post Office Depart- 
ment, amountiiig to some four and a half millions, were included in the amounts 
charged to (hose years ; but that was found to be a mistake. But they also 
said, with more triuli, that some five millions of moneys received under the 
treaties of indemnity with Fiance and Naples, and in trust for several Indian 
tribes, were included in the thirty-nine millions charged to the year 1837, 
which would reduce the actual expenditures of the year 1837 to thirty-four 
millions. But as this still appeared very large, it was contended that some 
five or six millions of that amount ought not to be charged to the extravagance 
of the administration, because that sum was expended in that year in sup- 
pressing Indian hostilities ! A pretty story, when it is well known to those 
who have devoted any attention to the subject, that the administration is not 
only justly chargeable with the most unparalleled waste of the public treas- 
ure in the late and existing wars with the Indians, but that those wars may 
be fairly traced and charged to the culpable neglect and bad management of 
the Department of the Governi«ent charged with the direction and control of 
Indian affairs. 

Another defence was, that the expenditures attending the removal of the 
Indians from the east to the" west of the Mississippi, amounting to several 
millions annually, ouglit to be regarded as extraordinary, and such as would 
have occurred under any administration. Wl.oever will look into this sub- 
ject will be satisfied that the necessary expenses <i,ttcnding the purchase of 
Indian lands and the removal of the Indians have been increased more than 
one hundred per cent, by the imbecility and faithlessness of the agents em- 
ployed ill the various branches of that service. But the charge which was 
most successful in blinding the people, and confounding the less informed, 
was, that all the excess of expenditure under the late and present adminis- 
trations, beyond the annual expenditures under Mr. Adams's administration, 
was to be ascribed to the extravagant and unprincipled course of the oppo- 
sition in Congress. The administration, it was said, had always been in fa- 
vor of economy ; and to prove (he assertion true, the statement of Mr. Wood- 
bury, before adverted to, was relied upon. The estimates sent to Congress 



by the Secretary of the Treasury, it vvas said, were always moderate and 
economical, and so it would appear from a reference to that statement. For 
example, the estimates for the year 1SS7, sent in from the Treasury Depart- 
ment in Decemher, 1836, are ostentatiously displayed in one column of the 
statement as amounting to no more than $22,651,442, while, in another 
column it appears that the annual expenditures in that year were $39,164,745;. 
and in a third column stating the excess of appropriations above the estimates 
of the Treasury, for that year, at $17,073,921 ! It is manifest that the well-in- 
formed or.-ly would be able to detect the fallacy of this argument, or to expose 
the hypocrisy of those who advanced it. If it be said that tlie Secretary might 
have been honestly mistaken in making an estimate of appropriations for the 
year 1837, greatly below the actual demands of the service, inasmuch as the 
expenses incurred in suppressing Indian hostilities, in that year, greatly ex- 
ceeded the expectations of all parties, still that does not excuse the attempt 
to impose upon the people by exhibiting the estimates, and contrasting them 
with the appropriations, as an argument in favor of the greater economy of 
the executive administration ; and still less does it excuse the attempt to 
keep up the same drku^ive appearances in the estimates for the service of 
the present year (1838) submitted on the 6th of December, 1837. In the 
report then submitted to Congress, the estimates of appropriations for the 
service of the year 1838 are stated at $20,523,249 only. Very moderate 
indeed, and worthy of all praise, in a republican statesman, considering the 
actual circumstances of the country at that time. But let us examine for a 
moment what tliose circumstances were. There were at that moment be- 
tween S,OOU and 10,000 troops employed in the prosecution of the Florida 
war, with no certain prospect of ending the war, at all events, before the 
spring of the next year ; and it afterwards j»ppeared, I believe, that at the 
time those estimates were sent in, the arrears then due in that branch of the 
public service, and forwhich there was no appropriation, exceeded $1,000,000-:, 
and upwards of $7,000,000 were afterwards actually appropriated for the 
service of 1838, not one cent of which was included in the estimates of the 
Treasury ! 

Tiiere were, also, at the period of those estimates (December, 1837) five 
or six Indian treaties already signed under the direction of tiie President, 
involving an expenditure of more than $3,000,000; and although they were 
not then ratified, yet, as their ratification was regarded as a matter of course, 
the Secretary of the Treasury was without apology for failing to notice in 
some form the appropriations necessary to carry them into effect. These 
treaties were afterwards ratified, and $1,200,000 were actually appropriated, 
to be expended in the year 1838, according to their stipulations. But this 
is not all. At the time the Treasury estimates v/ere sent in, the Secretary 
could not have been ignorant that the Secretary of War and the President 
had united in an earnest recommendation to increase the rank and file of the 
standing army to 15,000 men, and to augment considerably every branch of 
the military establishment and defences of the cou,ntry ; and many concur- 
rent circumstances, besides, indicated that this would be done ; yet no notice 
whatever was taken by the Secretary in his estimates of the increased charges 
upon the Treasury on this account. The army proper was increased so as 
to number betv/een 12,000 and 14,000 men, and the other branches of the 
military establishment were also augmented; to meet the expenses of which, 
jn the year 1838, upwards of $700,000 were voted by Congress. Those 
few items, referred to merely from memory, show an aggregate of $9,000,000 
demanded for the service of 1838, all, or the greater part of which, ought to 



10 

have been, and probably was, foreseen by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
yet no part of it was included in his estimates. It is by such concealments 
and artifices as these that the administration seeks to uphold a character for 
economy and retrenchment, and to throw upon the opposition and Congress 
the charge of extravagance. 1 conclude niy remarks upon this part of the 
Message by repeating my opinion, that the public interests demand the ap- 
plication of some remedy for this mischief. Some adequate penalty should 
be imposed to protect the people against such false pretences. 

I now propose to notice another part of the Message, which, frofti its con- 
nexion with the subjects of greatest interest at the present time, will be re- 
garded as the most interesting and important of the whole. 

After adverting to the defalcation of the late collector of the port of New 
York, (Mr. Swartwout,) and very naturally associating with it the idea of 
the necessity of a more " secure and safe system for the safe keeping and 
idisbursement of the public moneys,'' the President insists 

" That the application of the public money to private uses should be made a felony, and 
visited with severe and ignominious punishment." 

"The Government, it must be admitted," (says the President, in the same paragraph,) 
"has been, from its commencement, comparatively fortunate in this respect." 

Here, then, is a fair admission that until recently but a small portion of 
the public moneys has been embezzled by the officers charged with its col- 
lection ; yet the method of collecting and safe keeping heretofore in use is 
denounced and repudiated ; a new system is projected and insisted on ; and 
the further security is suggested of severe and ignominious penalties. Th^ 
enormous abuses successively brought to light under this administration con- 
tinue to be imputed to any but their true cause. The system of collection 
and disbursement is defective^ the method of accounts is defective ; the 
laws are defective! This has been the ready apology of the late and pres- 
ent administrations for all abuses. There were no serious complaints of 
abuses or defalcations in the Post Office Department until the party now in 
power undertook, as they said, to bring about a general reform of tl)e Gov- 
ernment ; but when a few years of maladministration had brought about a 
general derangement and the most corrupt practices in that Department, it 
was immediately proclaimed that the laws regulating the Department were 
eminently defective; the system of accountability in use, it was said, was a 
bad one; in fine, th-it nothing could retrieve its condition but a new organi- 
zation. The same excuses have repeatedly been urged in defence of the 
gross abuses which have prevailed in the War Department, in tiie depart- 
ments of Indian Affairs and of the Public Lands. Bad laws and a bad or- 
ganization are the only causes of abuse ever admitted by the friends of 
power; and the only remedies proposed or applied are new laws and a new 
organization. But I now take leave to notify the gentleman from New York, 
(Mr. Cambreleng,) that when he shall introduce his bill to provide the 
remedies suggested in this Message, I shall insist that the rules of this House 
be strictly enforced, and that his bill shall take rank in the rear of a bill now 
on the calendar of the House, entitled " A bill to secure the freedom of 
elections ;" but it might with more propriety be called '' A bill to secure in 
future a skilful and honest administration of public affairs;" d bill, sir, which 
provides the very best and the only effective remedy in the power of Con- 
gress to adopt, for all the abuses in the public service. Lest the provisions 
of this bill may have been forgotten, I hope the Clerk will be allowed to 
read it. 



11 

[The Clerk read the bill, which proposes'in the preamble to declare removals from of- 
fice upon political grounds, or for opinion's sake, " a violation of the freedom of elections, 
an attack upon the public liberties, and a high misdemeanor." The first section provides 
a penalty of not more than $1,000, removal from office, and perpetual disability to hold 
office, against any officer, agent, or contractor, under the Federal Government, convicted 
of intermeddling in any manner with elections. State or Federal, except in giving his own 
vote. The second section provides a penalty of S5,000, removal from office, and per- 
petual disability, against any officer of the Federal Government, having, under the consti- 
tution and laws, the power to appoint, or nominate and appoint, any office or agent of 
the Government, who shall be convicted of promising or bestowing any office or agency, 
upon any agreement on the part of the appointee to render political or other services in 
elections or otherwise; and a penalty not exceeding $1,000, dismissal from office, and 
perpetual disability, against any subordinate officer convicted of receiving office upon such 
terms. The President and judges of courts are excepted as to the penalty of removal 
from office.] 

The remedies proposed in this Message are applicable to evils in subordi- 
nate offices, which are but the consequences of greater ones which exist in 
higher places. I insist, sir, that when we begin again to apply remedies, we 
shall begin higher up on the calendar; that we shall begin at the head of the 
list. There e.xists a canker at the core, which must be eradicated before we 
can expect to heal the eruptions on the surface of affairs. All the remedies 
devised by the administration are applicable to others and to subordinates 
only, while the radical vice is in themselves. It is the spoils principle — it is 
the principle of corruption itself which has been adopted by the party in 
power as the only effective party cement — it is the false, corru|)t, and cor- 
rupting principle upon which the appointing power has been and continues 
to be exercised under the present prescriptive dynasty — it is tlie practice of 
appointing desperate, worthless, and unprincipled, men to office — men who, in 
general, possess no other merit than their partisan services and efficiency in 
elections. This, then, sir, is the great and fundamental evil. And now, sir, 
when most of the offices of greatest trust in the countr}' are filled by this class 
of men — by clamorous and needy favorites — when their abuses and defalca- 
tions have become so monstrous that their own patrons are compelled to ac- 
knowledge that nothing but the fear of the penitentiary can restrain them, a 
vain and idle attempt is made to substitute ignominious pains and penalties 
for an honest course of executive appointment and supeR^;ision ; and a hope 
equally idle and delusive is thrown out to the public, that unprincipled public 
officers may be made honest men by law ! And who are they who are set to 
watch — whose duty it is to watch defaulting receivers and collectors of the 
public moneys? Men, themselves, who acquired and now hold their stations 
by the successful operation of the same false and corrupt principle of ap- 
pointment which placed all those who are subordinates to them in office. 
The one class cannot be supported without the other — all must be sustained 
or fall together. 

But, Mr. Chairman, this is an old and threadbare theme with me. I have 
employed my time for years in an effort to attract the attention of the public 
to this subject in vain. I have often repeated all the arguments which have 
suggested themselves upon this subject on this floor, and, I am sorry to say, 
with small effect. I have ever believed, since I became advised of the ex- 
tent to which the appointing power continued to be abused, that there could 
be but one result, under the gross abuse of the appointing power which has 
prevailed of late. I have never doubted that time would develop an amount 
of fraud, peculation, and corruption, which would amaze and arouse the peo- 
ple, if the system should not effectually undermine the public morals, and de- 
stroy all sense of national pride and honor before their eyes could be opened. 



12 

Sir, I may claim lo liave penetrated still further into the probable results of 
this syateiTi. I foretold, upon this floor, that other results besides mere injury 
to the public service, would necessarily, in due course of time, follow in the 
train of the spoils system, as established and acted upon in some of the States 
in the Union as well as at Washington. I predicted that the time would 
come when these contests for the spoils, into which all elections would soon 
resolve themselves, would be decided by the sword. We have recently had 
a very fair illustration of the working of this system at Harrisburg; and that, 
sir, is but the beginning — the first-fruits of the system. We shall see the 
same scene exhibited by and by upon a larger theatre. When this detesta- 
ble principle ol party aggregation shall extend itself into all, or nearly all, 
the States of the Union, as it promises soon to do, we shall see our national 
elections contested and settled by the direct intervention of office-holders and 
office-seekers, backed by their respective partisans, made furious and despe- 
rate by the prospect of losing their share of the public spoils, and resolved lo 
incur every hazard to themselves and the country in asserting their claims. 

But, having so often urged the abuse of the appointing power as the true 
cause of the gross abuses known to exist in the public service, I am unwilling 
that the ground assumed shall rest upon my own assertion, when so many 
proofs are at hand to confirm what I have said. In the report of the com- 
mittee of the Senate appointed to investigate the condition of the Post Office 
Department in 1834, (page 8,) it will appear, by the admission of the head 
of that Department himself, (Mr. Barry,) that, between the 1st of A[)ril, 
1829, and the 1st of September, 1834, there had been one thousand three 
hundred and forty removals from office in that Department alone I The 
committee resolved to inquire into the grounds of so many removals; and, 
that there might be no want of specification, they took up the case of John 
Herron, who had been appointed postmaster at Putnam, in Ohio, in the 
place of Henry Saffbrd, removed. 

[Mr. Bet.l here read so much of the report of the committee as relates to the case alluded 
to, by which it appeared, from the statements furnished by the Post Office Department, 
that Herron was appointed in July, 1829, and continued in office until November, 1831, 
when he was dismissed. The amount due from him to the Department, during the time 
he continued in office, was estimated at $5.58 64, no part of which had ever been paid, and 
he had finally absconded. The committee then called upon the Postmaster General for the 
grounds upon which Saffbrd had been removed, and Herron pot in his place ; but the 
Postmaster General denied the right of the Senate to go into such an inquiry.] 

But, said Mr. B., the committee of this House, appointed in the same year, 
(1834,) and charged with the same duty, resolved to take up the inquiry into 
this case, at the point to which the Senate's committee were limited. It ap- 
pears from the report of the minority of the committee of the House (Doc. 
103, p. 215) that the Postmaster General pron)plly communicated the letters 
and other papers on file in that Department relating to the removal of Saf- 
ford and the appointment of Herron ; but the majority of the committee, con- 
sisting of Mr. Bcardsley, of New York ; Mr. Connor, of North Carolina ; Mr. 
Stoddert, of Maryland ; and Mr. Hawes, of Kentucky ; passed an order that 
they should be returned to the Postmaster General before they were copied. 
In this way it happened that these papers have never be'^n communicated to 
the public; but the minority of the committee, consisting of Mr. Whittlesey, 
of Ohio ; Mr. Everett, of Vermont ; and Mr. Watmough, of Pennsylvania ; 
state the contents of them from memory, they having heard them read in 
committee; and by that statement it appears that an application was made to 
remove Saffbrd upon the ground that although he was a professed friend of 
the administration, yet he was believed not to be thorough in his feelings. 



13 

His friends, hearing of the attempt to get him removed, represented to the 
Department that he was a true friend of the administration. There was no 
exception taken to his capacity or integrity, yet he was removed, and Her- 
ron, whose party fidelity was unquestioned by any one, was appointed in 
his place. Here is a pretty specimen of this evil, in the bud, which has 
since expanded into such monstrous shapes of abuse ! But there is yet a 
more important circumstance connected with this inquiry. Besidts the strange 
development, that a Postmaster General should not appear to be conscious 
of any misconduct in having dismissed an honest and competent public ser- 
vant from office upon such grounds, tiie still more astonishing fact appears in 
the sliape of an order adopted by the majority of the committee that they 
sanction the principle of this removal. The committee declare, in express 
terms, that they can see "nothing in the letters and petitions transmitted by 
tlie Postmaster General, toucliing the removal of H. Safford as postmaster at 
Putnam, Oiiio, and the appointment of J. Herron as his successor, which, i;/ 
t/ie slightest degree, impeaches the motives or criminates any act of the Post- 
master General, or is, in any respect, material to any object of legislation, 
or of public interest or concern^ 

Here is the solemn opinion of a majority of the committee of the Mouse, 
composed of some of the most prominent men of the party in power, pro- 
nounced in favor of the principle of removals fur opinion's sake; nor did 
they regard the question as of any public interest or concern! Though 
the successor, brought into office upon the ground of his superior fidel- 
ity to the party, had turned out to be a knave, and had actually run away 
with every cent of the revenue collected at his office in his pocket, still the 
public were declared to have no interest in the principle upo)i which the ap- 
pointment had been made! This case also presents a good specimen of the 
refinement upon simple proscription which prevailed with the late administra- 
tion, in the footsteps of which the present one treads. It was not sufficient 
that a man should be a friend of the administration ; if he was suspected of 
lukewarmness by any man of undoubted standing with the party, it was 
enough to destroy iiim. These are the principles upon which the appointing 
power has been exercised in this country ; and this the manner in which 
the patronage of the Government has been distributed for the last nine years. 
Is it any wonder that the loss of millions of the public treasure should be the 
consequence 1 We have seen, by the order adopted in the committee of the 
House, how the further progress of the inquir}- into the grounds upon which 
the great number of removals in the Post Office Department was arrested. 
Further inquiry was, in fact, useless, if thi) principle assumed by the com- 
mittee was well founded. 

I am not willing to lay aside these valuable reports, without adverting- to 
the facts which were incidentally brought to light before the committee of the 
Senate, relating to the removal of Wyman, postmaster at Lowell, Massachu- 
setts, and the appointment of Case. It belongs to a class of abuses which 
are now well known, I suppose, in every part of the Union. I allude to the 
corruption of the public press, and the direct connexion which exists between 
the administration papers generally and the Post Office Department. It ap- 
pears by the report of this committee, (page 11,) that William Wyman, an 
honest and competent postmaster, was rernoved from office, on the recom- 
mendation of the "democratic committee" of Lowell, without any other 
reason being assigned than that he was not a friend of the administration, 
and Eliphalel Case, the editor of the Lowell Mercury, a paper zealously de- 
voted to the administration, was appointed in his place. It was a condition 



14 

of tins appointment, plainly implied in the arrangement made between the 
several parties, that Case should continue to edit the Mercury for nothing, he 
having formerly received $300 per annum for tliat service ; and it was pro- 
ved that he complied with his bargain. How many hundreds of worthy men 
have been removed from their employment in this Department, upon pre- 
tences and suggestions equally repugnant lo reason and equally corrupt, the 
people of this country can never be informed ; for, while the evidence was 
in existence, the Postmaster General either refused to allow the papers in 
his office to be inspected, which, in general, was the only evidence that could 
be reached, or the party in the majority in Congress refused to investigate. 
But, sir, the door which might once have been opened upon a mass of evi- 
dence and proof is now closed forever! The papers in the office of appoint- 
ments have been consumed by fire ! Still enough remains to stamp with 
shame and dishonor the character of a party which could sanction a princi- 
Ide so intolerant, so tyrannical, and so ulteily subversive of all public virtue. 

It is a fact which ought to be more publicly known, that he who is now 
President of these United States was the first man of any great political dis- 
tinction in this country, who, as a party man, openly and shamelessly pro- 
posed that the Post Office Department should be administered upon party 
principles, and the immense influence of t!ie appointing power connected with 
that Department should be prostituted to such uses. But this fact will suffi- 
ciently appear from the correspondence which took place in 1822 between 
Mr. Van Buren and President Monroe, and also with Mr. Meigs, the Postmas- 
ter General, upon the subject of the appointment of a postmaster at Albany, 
in New York. There every observant reader will find the germe of the spoils 
system. In that correspondence it will appear that the appointment of a po- 
litical partisan was claimed as a matter of right on the one side, and of duty 
on the other, (the appointing power,) in order to give to the dominant party 
in New York the advantages of a political partisan at a point so important as 
Albany ; but the patriotism and independence of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Meigs 
resisted the application. They refused to act upon any such principles ; 
and when a man was appointed, who had the misfortune to be a federalist in 
politics, an appeal v/as taken from the decision of the Postmaster General to 
the people. A public meeting was held in Albany, vindicating their right 
to have a republican appointed to the office in question, and calling upon the 
President to apply the constitutional remedy in such cases for their relief. 
And what do you suppose, sir, these republicans meant by a constitutional 
remedy in such cases? It was the remedy of removal from office for opin- 
ion's sake ! 

But to return to the Message. Why consume our time in debating the 
remedies proposed by the President? Why pursue with relentless vengeance 
the incumbents of subordinate offices, particularly the miserable peculator 
who has only made off" with a few thousand dollars 1 Why pursue such small 
game, when ihe great delinquents are still allowed to revel in the uninterrupt- 
ed enjoyment of power, possessing neither the principles nor the capacity to 
be useful to the public, and daily abusing their trusts, to the infinite prejudice 
of every public interest? I allude, of course, to the leading executive 
chiefs, and, in a party point of view, the most influential — the very men who 
are the original and responsible authors of all the defalcations and abuses 
committed by the subordinates, to whose zealous and efficient support in the 
public elections they owe their own elevation, and without which aid they 
could not remain a single day in office, bvit for the impedimenc which the 
constitution interposes to prevent their iminediate downfall. I repeat, it is 



15 

small game which we are pursuing, in an economical point of view. I had 

occasion to speak of the defalcations disclosed in the report of the Secretary 
of the Treasury made to the House at the last session, and I made an esti- 
mate of the gross amount for which Hawkins, Harris, Boyd, Linn, and oth- 
ers, wiTc deficient, and found the aggregate about §400,000. If we set 
down the defalcations of vSwartwout and Price both a; a million and a half, 
the entire sum of the late defalcations will not exceed two millions — perhaps 
the ultimate loss will not exceed one million of dollars. Now, I conjure 
honorable members to reflect that (his sum, though large, is but a fraction of 
the losses sustained by the people of this country bj defalcations of a ditl'erent 
kind — by defalcations in capacity, in requisite skill, and, above ail, in sound 
political principles, on the part of the adminiatration. Let any man atten)pl 
to estimate the actual losses, in dollars and cents, which this country has sus- 
tained by an incompetent, unprincipled, and electioneering administration, 
and he will at once see that our business now is with higher game than that 
upon the track of which we have been put by the President. Without pre- 
tending to estimate the indefinite injury, the hundreds of millions in losses, 
which a few years of great commercial and financial derangement must have 
inflicted upon a great nation like this, let us take a more practical view of 
the subject. Let us set down a tow of the leading items in the account, which 
the people may, upon clear and tangible grounds, slate against liie great na- 
tional defaulters to whom I have alluded, and who have not been removed or 
dismissed from (iffice. 

First. There was the Black Hawk war — a war which originated in the 
sheer neglect and culpable negligence of the administration, and which cost 
the country $3,000,000. 

Second. There was the lale Creek war — a war notoriousl}' caused or in- 
stigated by the speculators in Indian lands, and which might have been 
averted, but for tlie imbecility of some, and the want of principle in others, 
of the public agents intrusted by the administration with the execution of the 
treaty of 1832. I estimate the cost of tliat war at $1,500,000. 

Third. We may safely estimate the extra cost of the Florida war, or the 
clear excess above what a competent and faithful system of administration 
would have expended on this war, at $12,000,000. I, sir, predict that the 
entire cost of this war to the country will not be less than $20,000,000. 
And when it is borne in mind that this disastrous war would have been pre- 
vented by a judicious selection of agents in the management of the Indians, 
the charge which I make against the administration of an excess of expendi- 
ture upon it will be considered moderate. This, it must be recollected, was 
purely an executive war — a war commenced and waged entirely at execu- 
tive discretion. Congress was only appealed to, from time to time, to vote 
the sums of money which were said to be essential to its successful prosecu- 
tion ; and these appeals were often made after the troops were in the field, 
and no alternative was left but to vote the money. I take this occasion to 
remark, that it was for voting for such appropriations as these, and occasion- 
ally for largo sums stipulated in Indian treaties ratified by the Senate, that 
the whigs in Congress have been charged by the apologists of the administra- 
tion as equally to blame with themselves for the large expenditures incurred 
under these heads ; but with what justice, the public will decide. 

Fourth. The increased cost of Indian treaties and Indian emigration, in 
consequence of the unnecessary multiplication of officers and agents employ- - 
ed, the incapacity and dishonesty of many of them, and the general want of 
skill and fidelity in the superintendencv. T estimate the loss under this head 
at $5,000,000 at least. 



16 

Fifth, and last, I will mention the item of $1,000,000, which the country 
'has been taxed with to suppress disturbances on the Canada frontier. Every 
cent of tliis expenditure, 1 maintain, would have been saved to the nation if 
the President, instead of temporizing and waiting to see what public senti- 
ment would be, and suflering the feeble proclamations of the Governors of 
States to go forth as a substitute for his own, had, upon the first indication 
of disturbances in that quarter, issued such a proclamition as he has only 
done within a few weeks past. But, sir, that did not suit the policy of an 
electioneering administration. It was hazarding quite too much to take 
ground in advance of public opinion throughout the Union ; and so the in- 
habitants on tlie border not being advised of the real intentions of the Gov- 
ernment, many of tiiem became committed, of course, according to their 
natural sympathies and feelings, and the national character has consequently 
suffered with the Treasury. These few items, selected only because the}' 
are the largest and most obvious, make, in the aggregate, a loss of upwards 
of $20,000,000. 

Let us, then, instead of wasting our energies in tlie pursuit of small de- 
faulters, direct our inquiries and point the indignation of the country against 
the great official delinquents — against those who, being the real authors of 
all the abuses which exist in the land, still hold their places, and arrogantly 
seek to gain credit with the people by proposing remedies for evils of tlieir 
own creation. This country is peculiarly situated in reference to a weak 
and unprincipled administration. In England, a bad ministry can be brought 
to the bar of public opinion at once ; and, upon the heel of any great official 
delinquency, judgment is pronounced upon them, and they are hurled from 
power brffore time shall have softened public indignation, or afforded the of- 
fenders the opportunity of diverting public attention to some other subject. 
Here it is only at stated times, fixed by the constitution, tliat a bad adminis- 
tration can be brought to account, or be removed from their places; and 
theyma\'goon for years in a constant course of administrative abuse and 
imbecility — they may commit the grossest infractions of the constitution it- 
self — they may prostitute tiie patronage of the Government to the vilest and 
most selfish purposes — and, after all, escape the sentence of an injured peo- 
ple. Ample time is afforded to enable tliem to court and flatter when they 
find they have given offence, to get up some new subject of excitement, and 
turn away the stroke; of popular wrath before it is allowed by the constitu- 
tion to fall upon the cuiprils. I therefore admonish the opposition in this 
House not to be too sanguine ol the results of recent developments, whatever 
impression they may make for the present. It is yet two years before the 
people can decide finally upon tliem ; and the puny defaulters, whom it is 
proposed to pursue and hunt to destruction, will soon be forgotten. They 
will, at best, only become the scrine-goals of their superiors in station. It 
is against the principles and practices of the Executive Chief himself that op- 
poshion can be made effective. It is by carrying the war into the heart of 
power, and exposing the defects and corruptions which exist there — it is by 
administering a corrective to the original fountain of evil, alone, that we can 
expect to bring about real reform, and confer a lasting benefit upon the 
country. 

The next clause of the Message which struck me as deserving notice is in 
these words : 

«<But the appointing power cannot always be well advised in its selections, and the ex- 
perience of every country has shown that public officers cannot always be proof against 
temptation." 



17 

This must be regarded as a singular and precious admission, coming as it 
does from ihe appointed successor of General Jackson. What ! the Execu- 
tive not infallible ! And is it admitted, at last, that there are abuses in some 
branches of the public service? Truly, public officers are not always proof 
against temptation, nor can the Execuiive be aUvays well advised in its selec- 
tions. But how does it happen that the late and present administrations 
have been more unfortunate in this respect than all those which went before 
them ? That is the question. How does it happen that when the Executive 
has been well advised, how does it happen tint when it has been advised ot 
former defalcation and delinquency, they have formed no objection in ma- 
king its selections, as in the case of Linn, as I understand that case, and as 
was certainly the case of a Jate district attorney in Alabama? Ill does it 
become such an Executive to complain that it caniiot always be well advised. 
How has it happened that the appointees of the Lite and present administra- 
tions have so generally given way when exposed to temptation ? I answer, 
because both the advice and the selections were based upon false and cor- 
rupt principles and maxims. Partisan service and party fidelity have been 
the only tests of tilness for office, and when the Executive was well advised 
upon these points, it was all that was required. 

In the same paragraph every well-informed reader will be astonished to 
find a true coiistitutional principle connected with such a subject, recognised 
by such authority, and an exhortation to Congress to enforce it. 

" Congress," says the PresiJent, "cannot be too jealous of those who are intrusted with 
the pubUc money, and I shall at all times be disposed to encourage a watchful discharge of 
this duty." "If a more direct co-operation on the part of Congress in the supervision of 
the conduct of the officers intrusted with the custody and application of the public money 
is deemed advisable, it will give me pleasure to assist in the est'ablishment of any judicious 
and constitutional plan by which that object may be accomplished." 

Who would have believed that we should have had so decided and un- 
equivocal a recantation of the doctrines applicable to this subject avowed and 
so successfully maintained under the late administration, and that, too, by a 
man pledged to walk in the footsteps of the late Executive Chief? That 
Congress cannot be too jealous of those who have the custody of the public 
money, is frankly admitted; and the President actually tells us that he will 
encourage the exercise of that duty ! But he earnostly recommends a direct 
co-operation of Congress in the supervision of the conduct of public officers ! 
This must appear incredible to those who have been conversant with the 
doctrines of the party in power for several years past — but nevertheless it is 
true. Congress is actually invoked to co-operate with the President in the 
business of superintending the conduct of his subordinat*; officers ! This 
amounts almost to revolution. Still all is not yet told. The President fur- 
ther submits to our consideration^— 

" Whether a committee of Congress might not bs profitably employed in inspecting, at 
such intervals as might be deemed proper, the aflfairs and accounts of officers intrusted with 
the custody of the public moneys." * * " They might report to the Executive such 
defalcations as were found to exist, with a view to a prompt removal from office, unless the 
default was satisfactorily accounted for." 

The great democratic party must certainly be confounded by this last prop- 
osition ; or is this Message intended to be a new confession of political 
faith for the whole party ? Congress is unequivocally invited to institute in- 
vestigations into the conduct of executive officers, and not one word is said 
of the necessity of specifications, or of impeachments, as conditions prece- 
dent ! The doctrines and recommendations of this part of the Message ap- 
pear to me to be so entirely repugnant in every particular to the opinions 
2 



18 

anJ senlimenta of the late President, that I am tempted to go back to the 
messages and otli(.M- state papers emanating from the late adatinistralion, and 
to trace the contrast, that we may see what the creed of the dominant paity 
is to be for the future. 

From the grant, in general terms, of " the executive power" to the Pres- 
ident, by the constitution, and the assignment to him, in the same general 
terms, of the duty of taking " care that the laws be faithfully executed," and 
the terms of his oath of office, by which he is required to " preserve, protect, 
and defend, the constitution," a degree of power was deduced and arrogated 
to the Executive, under the late administration, which was truly appalling, 
and would, if sustained by the country, inevitably lead to despotic power. 
From the grant of the " executive power," the late President claimed the ex- 
clusive direction and control of every thing in the affairs of Government, in 
its nature executive and not legislative. It being made his duty to " take 
care that the laws be faitlifully executed, and to preserve, protect, and de- 
fend, the constitution," it followed that this duly devolved upon him exclu- 
sively, and that any interference on the part of Congress, witii a view to the 
same object, was gratuitous and unconstitutional, except in the discharge of 
the duties expressly assigned to it in the constitution. He also derived from 
the same source the idea of his exclusive responsibility for the faithful execu- 
tion of the laws, and the preservation, protection, and defence, of the consti- 
tution ; and, building upon this foundation, he claimed, first, the right, in all 
cases, to give such construction to the constitution and laws as he thought 
proper; for, it was contended it would be highly unreasonable and absurd to 
make any man, or any department of the Government, responsible for the 
protection and defence of the constitution, and the faithful execution of the 
laws, according to the construction of any other department, or any other 
tribunal whatever. Secondly, he maintained that every officer under the 
Government, except the judges of the courts, were only instruments in his 
hands, created for no other purpose but to enable him to execute these 
solemn constitutional duties. From hence, also, was deduced the doctrine 
that the supervision of the conduct of all public officers was the sole right and 
duty of the Executive. From hence, also, the deduction was natural and 
easy, that the President ought to be allowed not only to select all the instru- 
ments to be used by him in the execution of the laws, and for the preserva- 
tion of the constitution, in the manner provided in the constitution, but that 
he ought to have the further power, not given in the constitution, of setting 
aside those instruments at his discretion. 

If these doctrines and assumptions of executive duty and authority do not 
present a perfect scheme of despotic power — if they do not amount to a 
clear and substantial concentration of all power in the hands of one man — I 
have no conception of what more would be requisite forsuch a consummation. 
If any one of these powers can be maintained in the extent contended for, 
then the late President was well warranted in maintaining that Congress 
could pass no law, however ingeniously devised — adopt no form or mode for 
the deposite, safe keeping, or disbursement, of the public moneys — which 
could deprive him of the actual custody and disposition of them. He had a 
perfect right to consider not only the Secretary of the Treasury, but the 
Bank of the United States also, as his mere instrument, contrived with a 
view to enable him to discharge his appropriate duty of keeping the public 
moneys safely, and paying them out for the support of Government, accord- 
ing to his own construction of his duly and power in this as in every other 
branch of executive administration. He had a right to dispense with either, 



19 

or both, as he thought proper. According to the same theory of executive 
powers and duties, the attempt of Congress to investigate the condition of the 
executive departments, or into the conduct of public officers, at a late ses- 
sion, was an impertinent intrusion into matters that concerned others ; an at- 
tempt, in fact, at usurpation on the part of Congress, the supervision of the 
conduct of public officers being an act in its nature executive, and the Presi- 
dent being also exclusively responsible for the conduct of all the departments, 
and all public officers. 

The tremendous powerof removal, claimed without any other responsibil- 
ity than that which attaches in making the original appointment, under the 
power and duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed, and that the 
constitution be preserved, is also well founded, according to these views of 
tho extent of executive power. And, sir, it will be found that all these ex- 
travagant notions pf executive power were sustained by the majority in this 
House during thelate administration. The Postmaster General (Mr. Ken- 
dall) took ground boldly in his letter to the investigating committee of this 
House, in 1836, refusing to communicate any information as to the motives 
or reasons upon which he had removed one postmaster and appointed another 
in his place, alleging that he considered it his duty to " regard the constitu- 
tional limitations of power, and to give the information required would tend 
to subvert them ;" and this doctrine was acquiesced in by the House. I have 
already referred to the opinion of another committee, which was acquiesced 
in by the House, that it is no misdemeanor in the Executive, and a matter of 
no public interest or concern whatever, that a public officer should be remo- 
ved on account of his politics. Thus, sir, was a system of tyianny lately 
upheld and established upon alleged constitutional grounds, which possessed 
the merit, at least, of consistency in all its assumptions of power. It was 
upon the ground of the exclusive responsibility of the Executive for the con- 
duct of all his public officers, and his absolute power over them, and because 
it was highly convenient at the same time, that when any one under the late 
administration ventured to find fault with any subordinate officer of the Gov- 
ernment, the answer in this House invariably was, why do you not attack 
the President himself? He is responsible for the faithful execution of the 
laws. Why do you not have the manliness to attack him directly, who is 
an antagonist worthy of you? Why do you seek to vent your hostility to 
General Jackson in attacks upon the officers appointed by him, and for 
whose good conduct lie is bound to answer ? 

But, sir, what do we find to be the duties of the piesent Chief Magistrate 
upon these fundamental doctrines'? It is true, sir, he is silent upon some of 
them, but we may justly congratulate ourselves and the country that the 
proper constitutional rights and powers of Congress over the public treasure 
have been fully recognised in principle, whether the President intended to go 
that length or not. It is of no use now to inquire under what circumstances 
this recognition has been made. The power of Congress to inquire into and 
supervise the conduct of all public officers we also regard as yielded without 
limitation. But, above all, we have reason to rejoice that the foundation 
upon which that most odious, mischievous, and despotic of all powers, the 
unlimited power of removal, has been maintained, is removed. I am far 
from thinking that the President would put this construction upon his own 
Message ; but such will be the force of the principles he does admit. The 
doctrine of exclusive duty and responsibility in taking care that the laws 
be faithfully executed, and that the constitution be preserved, is express- 
ly abandoned. It is admitted to be both the right and the duty of Congress to 



20 

interfere, both by legal enactments and by direct supervision of the conduct 
of public officers. Again, it is admitted that executive supervision is in= 
competent to tiie task of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed without 
the aid of Congress! In truth, the executive power in the hands of the 
present incumbents is proclaimed by the President himself, in the Message 
before us, to be a failure ! He is not only willing to divide the responsibility 
of the executive department with Congress, but he admits that, without the 
co-operation of Congress in the discharge of executive duties, the public 
service must suffer. Thero is, therefore, no longer an}' plausible ground re- 
maining upon which to rest the unlimited power of removal. 

But, Mr. Chairman, while I applaud the candor of the President in making 
the important admissions to which I have alluded, I cannot agree that his 
proposition of a congressional coinmittec, upon the terms he suggests, is en- 
titled to be treated with equal respect. It looks as though he wished to 
stipulate an equivalent for the concessions he has made. When we come to 
analyze the characterand tendency of the proposition, nothing could be more 
insulting to Congress. In the first place, it appears to come in the shape 
of a boon — an act of grace and favor by the President. Congress may or 
will hereafter be perinitted by the Executive to institute committees of in- 
quiry to a limited extent ! Heretofore, it is irue that this power in Congress 
has been actually denied ; but still the country did not acquiesce in the pro- 
hibition, and the President will not acquire any credit for conceding to Con- 
gress a privilege which was always its right, primarily and fundamentally. 
But this is not the most objectionable feature in the proposition. If I understand 
the nature of the duties the committee of Congress proposed by the President 
would have to perform, they would be the mere scavengers of the President, 
compelled to grope their way into the private recesses, the inner closets, of sus- 
pected public officers — pursuing their victims through all manner of tainted 
and infected places, often bound to disregard every feeling and sympathy that 
is honorable to our nature, dragging to light the concealed and venial weak- 
nesses and aberrations of men standing high in the estimation of society, and 
who perhaps are still more honest than their neighbors who have never pass- 
ed through such an ordeal ; and to what end or purpose, at last, will Con- 
gress have descended, to take upon itself as one of its ordinary duties a ser- 
vice so revolting ! Can they give efl'cct to their investigation ? No ; they 
cannot remove a single officer. Our committees will only act in the capacity 
of informers and catchpoles for the Executive ; and when we shall have pre- 
iiented a wretched delinquent to the notice of the President, he may or may 
not punish him, or remove him from office, at his discretion. But, be- 
sides the degradation, there are two capital objections to this plan of a con- 
gressional committee, founded on higher principles. First, the entire re- 
sponsibility of seeing that the public moneys arc in safe hands, and that the 
public otficers generally are honest and capable, will be shifted from the 
President, and thrown upon Congress. Who, after such a system of con- 
rressional su|)ervi5io!i of all public officers shall go 'n)\.o operation, would ever 
dream of making the President responsible for any defalcation in subordi- 
nate officers] It would be said at once, in answer to any attack upon the 
Executive, that it was tho business of Congress to have been more dili- 
gent in their inquiries into the conduct of the defaulting officer. Secondly, 
nothing could add more to the influence of the Executive than a plan which 
proposes to hiave him the full possession, liot only of tiie appointing power, 
as heretofore exwcised, but of the power of discretionary removal ; and at 
the 3<^mc time iclievea him from the burden and odium of official scrutiny 



21 

intQ the conduct of polilical and personal favorites, and of removing llicm 
upon his own suggestion. He would thus be left in the full possession of all 
that is beneficient and desirable, connected with the appointing power and 
tlie distribution of executive patronage, and relieved of all that is ungracious. 
When he would be called upon to remove an old friend and partisan from 
office for good cause, the report of the committee would shield him from any 
unpleasant responsibility of a personal nature. Another objection to this 
plan would be, that Congress, from its composition and constitution, would be 
incompetent to examine and supervise the conduct of public officers, as a 
regular and reliable moans of securing a faithful discharge of official duty. 
The Executive alone is competent to that duty in general ; and if Congress 
should undertake it, the consequence would be greater abuses in the public 
s(?rvice than ever. In my opinion, therefore, when either House of Congress 
shall appoint an investigating committee, it will become their character and 
dignity to act independently of executive recommendation or pleasure, and, 
standing upon the liigli ground of constitutional duty and privilege, institute 
inquiries at iheir own discretion, whenever the public interest shall appear 
10 demand them. 

There is but one other portion of the Message upon which I desire to 
make a few remarks. In the argument submitted by the President in behalf 
of his favorite sub-treasury scheme, after referring, in exaggerated terms, 
to the disasters in trade, the reckless speculations, and other evils incident to 
in)prudent expansions of bank credit, and then adverting to the strong inter- 
est which existed while the banks were the fiscal agents of the Government, 
that money should be accumulated in their hands, he makes the following re- 
flections : 

" It is thus that a concentrated money power is tempted to become an active agent in 
political afl'airs, and all past experience has shown which side it will be arrayed. We de- 
ceive ourselves if we suppose that it will ever be found asserting and supporting the rights 
of the community at large, in opposition to the claims of the few." 

" Nor is it the motive of combinations for the acquisition of legislative influence to con- 
fine their interference to the single object for which they were originally formed. " " The in- 
fluence in the direction of public affairs of the community at large is, therefore, in no slight 
danger of being sensibly and injuriously affected by giving to a comparatively small, but 
very efficient class, a direct and exclusive personal interest in so important a feature of the 
legislation of Congress as that which relates to the custody of public moneys." " Laws 
acting on private interests should be confined within the narrowest limits ; when not thus 
instituted, they lead to combinations of powerful associations, foster an influence neces- 
sarily selfish, and turn the fair course of legislation to sinister ends." 

I am persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that, if the President had not been infat- 
uated, absolutely blinded, by the strong interest he feels in carrying his sub- 
treasury scheme, he would never have presented to the public an argument 
which, when it shall be consideicd in connexion with the true stale of the 
question, will aj)pcar the very strongest tliat the opponents of that most mis- 
chievous measure could desire. Who is it that tells the people of the dan- 
ger of a concentrated money power? The man who, directly or indirectly, 
controls an annual distribution of thirty millions of dollars ! the very man 
under whose direct and absolute control it is proposed to place whatever sur- 
plus money may be in the Treasury at any time — thus adding to his money 
power,already too great for the safety of our institutions ; for who now does not 
understand that, by the established doctrines of the da}', no officer can be au- 
thorized by law, charged with the custody of the public money, who will not 
be subject to the absolute control and direction of the President ? No offi- 
cer can be appointed, according to this doctrine, who will not always feel 
that he holds his office at executive discretion ; nor is there any power in 



22 

Congress, according to this doctrine, to protect such olficer against the arbi- 
trary and corrupt interference of the Executive. Until the power of remo- 
val is regulated by law, this must be the necessary result of this scheme ; and 
we find in the bills which have heretofore been presented, no provision 
against the uncontrolled exercise of that power over the keepers of tiie pub- 
lic money. The supervision by a committee of Congress proposed by the 
President does not imply any disposition on his part to waive the vast pow- 
er claimed under the late administration, of assuming the custody and con- 
trol of the public moneys whenever he shall think it expedient, by the exer- 
cise of the power of removal. 

But the mere custody and control of tlie public moneys will add but an 
inconsiderable degree of influence and power to the Executive in the com- 
parison, when we reflect upon the far greater source of power which this fa- 
mous sub-treasury scheme proposes to vest in the President. It is express- 
ly avowed in a subsequent part of the Message that the plan of the sub- 
treasury, which he has in view, will not preclude the (lovernment from 
employing the State banks, " like other State institutions." " They may be 
used or not in conducting tlie affairs of the Government," as public poli- 
cy or convenience may require. Thus the monstrous proposition is enter- 
tained and attempted to be carried through Congress, by which the adminis- 
tration will have eigiit hundred banks once more invited and tempted to vie 
with each other in subserviency lo power — in such a course of conduct as 
will conciliate the Executive, and induce it to vouchsafe a portion of the 
public moneys to their keeping and use as heretofore. But it is not by thF, 
principle of favor or hope alone that it is proposed to subject all the banks 
and the whole banking system lo the influence and control of the administra- 
tion. Fear and the principle of s(;lf-preservation, in general much more 
powerful influences, are also intended to be brought into active use, if need 
be. It can be demonstrated, that if the sub-treasury system is established, 
with the principles which prevail in this administration, no bank of the 
eiglit hundred now in operation in the United States can, with safety to it- 
self, provoke the hostility of the administration, or ever fail to second its 
policy and su()port its interccsts ; and thus, sir, the entire money power of 
the country, public Treasury, banks, and all, will be resolved into an in- 
crease of executive p-ttronago. If you ask me how this subjection of the 
banks to the administration can be brought about, 1 answer, in a manner at 
once simple and efi'ective. The administration will only have to select some 
one or more confidential and trust-worthy partisans, whom they shall already 
jiavi- appointed to the chief places of trust in the sub-treasury scheme, and 
intimate to him that such a bank requires to be dealt with, and in thirty oi 
sixty days, at furthest, its work is done — it will be discredited, or compelled 
to wind up its aflairs. A fund of fifty or a hundred thousand dollars would 
be sufficient in most cases ; in some others, a greater ; and in some, perhaps, 
the temporary use of half a million would be required to eflect the destruc- 
tion of the obnoxious institution. How perfectly simple and easy the pro- 
cess of sending a secret agent into any of the States of the West, for exam- 
ple, with some few hundred thousands of the public money, or with authority 
to draw on some Eastern bank, employed to disguise the source of the at- 
tack ; no difhcully will exist in exchanging such funds at any time for the lo- 
cal currency. That etTected, it would only remain to convert the notes of 
the several banks in a State, thus picked up, into the notes of the one mark- 
ed out for destruction ; then present the notes thus collected for payment ; 
and if one blow thui suddenly dealt ohould not suffice, repeat il until it tould 



23 

be borne no longer. He lliat supposes such a scheme of influence and in- 
timidation in regard to the Stale banks wholl\' improbable, from the atrocity 
of the proceedings necessary to accomplish il, knows nothing of this admin- 
istration, its policy, its principles, or its practices. All this may be done in a 
manner so stealthy, that no trace of Government agency can be found, even 
by the proposed congressional committee, in the whole proceeding. The 
Globe may safely assure its readers that the administration are wholly 
guiltless ; but the sharpsightedness of every bank in the Union will see 
whence the blow came, and they would govern themselves accordingly. 
Now, let an honest people look into this subject, and inquire in what quarter 
ihey are to apprehend the existence of a " concentrated money power." 
In whose hands will it be " tempted to become an active agent in political 
aflairs?" Will the interest of " the community at large," or " the claims of 
the few," be most apt to prevail in such hands ? Who are they who would 
be most apt to form " powerful associations," to " foster an influence neces- 
sarily selfish, and turn the fair course of legislation to sinister endsl" Again, 
who are they, as a class, whose private interests are to be most promoted by 
this measure 1 Who are the " few" whose interests are most likely to be 
supported at the expense of " the community at large?" I answer all these 
questions confidently, and, I trust, satisfactorily, by pointing to the possessors 
of ofllicial station and power — the office-holders — those whose salaries, whose 
influence and consideration in society, depend upon remaining in office. This 
is the tribe most concerned in the establishment of the sub-treasury. 



rir 



LD D 10 



